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The universal properties of power law and small world phenomenon of net-
works seem unavoidably obstacles for security of networking systems. Exist-
ing models never give secure networks. We found that the essence of security
is the security against cascading failures of attacks and that nature solves the
security by mechanisms. We proposed a model of networks by the natural
mechanisms of homophyly, randomness and preferential attachment. It was
shown that homophyly creates a community structure, that homophyly and
randomness introduce ordering in the networks, and that homophyly creates
inclusiveness and introduces rules of infections. These principles allow us to
provably guarantee the security of the networks against any attacks. Our re-
sults show that security can be achieved provably by structures, that there is
a tradeoff between the roles of structures and of thresholds in security engi-
neering, and that power law and small world property are never obstacles for
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security of networks.
Network security has become a grand challenge in the current science and technology. We
proposed a mathematical definition of network security, and a new model of networks by natural
mechanisms of homophyly, randomness and preferential attachment. We found that networks
of our model satisfy a serious of new topological, probabilistic and combinatorial principles,
and that the new principles ensure that the networks are provably secure. Our model provides
a foundation for both theoretical and practical analyses of security of networks. Generally,
our model demonstrates that nature may solve security of complex systems by mechanisms,
exploring a new principle for networking systems in nature, society, economics, industry and
technology etc.
Many real networks satisfy the power law (1–3), and the small world phenomenon (4–6).
A surprising discovery in network theory in the first 10 years after the discovery of power
law in (1), is perhaps that network topology is universal in nature, society and industry (2).
This universality allowed researchers from different disciplines to embrace network theory as a
common paradigm. The understanding of networks is a common goal of an unprecedented
array of traditional disciplines: For instance, cell biologists use networks to capture signal
transduction cascade and metabolism; computer scientists are mapping the Internet and the
WWW; epidemiologists follow transmission networks trough which virus spread (2).
From the second decade of network theory, security of networks has become a sharper
focus and a grand challenge. We have to understand how the internet responds to attacks and
traffic jams, or how the cell reacts to changes in its environments, or how the global economy
responses to the current financial crisis, or even how a society reacts to a social crisis. A basic
question of this issue is the security of networks.
To understand the essence of security of networks, we examine the two classic models of
networks. The first is the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi model (7, 8). In this model, we are given n nodes, and
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a number p, and create an edge with probability p for each pair of nodes. The second is the
preferential attachment (PA, for short) model (1). In this model, for a given initial graph, G0
say, and a natural number d, we build the network G by steps. Suppose that Gt−1 is defined.
At step t, we create a new node, linking to d nodes chosen with probability proportional to the
degrees of nodes in Gt−1.
Security must depend on strategies of attacks. Typical strategies are the physical attack of
removal of nodes or edges, and the cascading failures of attacks.
In (9–11), it has been shown that in scale-free networks of the PA model, the overall network
connectivity measured by the sizes of the giant connected components and the diameters does
not change significantly under random removal of a small fraction of nodes, but is vulnerable
to removal of a small fraction of the high degree nodes.
In (6, 12–14), the cascading failure model was proposed to study rumor spreading, disease
spreading, voting, and advertising etc. In (15), it has been shown that in scale-free networks of
the PA model even weakly virulent virus can spread.
The Essence of Network Security
Let G = (V, E) be a network. Suppose that for each node v ∈ V , there is a threshold φ(v)
associated with it. For an initial set S ⊂ V , the infection set of S in G is defined recursively as
follows: (1) Each node x ∈ S is called infected, and (2) A node x ∈ V becomes infected, if it
has not been infected yet, and φ(x) fraction of its neighbors have been infected. We use infG(S )
to denote the infection set of S in G.
The cascading failure models depend on the choices of thresholds φ(v) for all v. We consider
two natural choices of the thresholds. The first is random threshold cascading, and the second
is uniform threshold cascading. We say that a cascading failure model is random, if for each
node v, φ(v) is defined randomly and uniformly, that is, φ(v) = r/d, where d is the degree of v in
G, and r is chosen randomly and uniformly from {1, 2, · · · , d}. We say that a cascading failure
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model is uniform, if for each node v, φ(v) = φ for some fixed number φ.
To understand the nature and essence of security of networks, we compare the two strategies
of physical attacks and the cascading failure models of attacks. For this, we introduce the notion
of injury set of physical attacks. Let G = (V, E) be a network, and S be a subset of V . The
physical attacks on S is to delete all nodes in S from G. We say that a node v is injured by
the physical attacks on S , if v is not connected to the largest connected component of the graph
obtained from G by deleting all nodes in S . We use injG(S ) to denote the injury set of S in G.
We depict the curves of sizes of the infection sets and the injury sets of attacks of top degree
nodes of networks of the ER and PA models in Figure 1(a), and Figure 1(b) respectively. From
the figures, we know that for any network, G say, generated from either the ER or the PA model,
the following properties hold: (1) the infection sets are much larger than the injury sets, (2) the
attacks of top degree nodes of size as small as O(log n) may cause a constant fraction of nodes of
the network to be infected under the cascading failure models of attacks, and (3) structures play
a role in security of networks, by observing the difference between Figure 1(a), and Figure 1(b).
The experiments in Figures 1(a) and 1(b) show that the essence of network security is the
security against any attacks of sizes polynomial in log n under the cascading failure models.
Let M be a model of networks. We investigate the security of networks of model M. We
define the security of networks under both uniform and random threshold cascading failure
models.
Let G be a network of n nodes constructed from model M. For the random threshold
cascading failure model, we say that G is secure, if almost surely (meaning that with probability
arbitrarily close to 1 as n grows), the following holds: for any set S of size bounded by a
polynomial of log n, the size of the infection set of S in G is bounded by o(n), meaning that it
is negligible comparing with n. For the uniform threshold cascading failure model, we say that
G is secure, if almost surely, the following holds: for some arbitrarily small φ, i.e., φ = o(1),
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for any set S of size bounded by a polynomial of log n, the infection set of S in G with uniform
threshold φ has size o(n).
Questions and Results
By the definitions of security of networks, and by the experiments in Figures 1(a), and 1(b),
we have that both the ER and the PA models never give secure networks.
Notice that randomness is the mechanism of the ER model, and is in fact the mechanism
for the small world property for almost all networks (by observing all other models and real
networks), and that preferential attachment is the mechanism of the PA model which guarantees
the power law of the networks. The experiments in Figures 1(a), and 1(b) show that neither
randomness nor preferential attachment alone is a mechanism for security of networks. This
also implies that small world property and power law seem obstacles for security of networks.
The fundamental questions are thus: Are power law and small world property really ob-
stacles for security of networks? What mechanisms and principles can guarantee security of
networks? Is there an algorithm to construct secure networks? In this paper, we will answer
these questions.
We found that homophyly is a new mechanism of networks, that homophyly guarantees a
community structure of networks, that homophyly and randomness introduce ordering in net-
works and generate a degree priority principle, that homophyly creates inclusiveness and in-
troduces infection rules in networks. These discoveries allow us to give an algorithm based
on natural mechanisms of homophyly, randomness or uncertainty and preferential attachment
to construct networks such that the networks are provably secure, follow a power law, have
the small diameter property, and furthermore, have a navigation algorithm of time complexity
O(log n).
The results show that security can be achieved by structures of networks, that there exists
a tradeoff between the role of structure and the role of thresholds in security of networks, and
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that neither power law nor small world property is an obstacle of security of networks.
Security Model
How can we construct secure networks? Networks are proved universal in a wide range of
disciplines in both nature and society. This suggests that natural mechanisms of the evolution
of complex systems in nature and society maybe helpful for us to construct secure networks.
Let us consider a mental experiment in evolution of networking systems in nature. Assume
that H is the current network. Suppose that a new individual v is born. Then v has its own
characteristic from the very beginning of its birth either as a remarkable element or a normal
element. If v is born as a remarkable element, then it develops some links to individuals in H
by the preferential attachment scheme in the whole H, and some links to remarkable elements
in H by chance, and v will develop its own community. If v is born as a normal individual, then
it is very likely that v joins randomly some group of individuals, in which case, v links to some
individuals in that group by a preferential attachment scheme.
Based on this mental experiment, we propose a new model of networks, the security model
below.
The security model proceeds as follows: (1) Given a homophyly exponent a and a natural
number d, let Gd be an initial d-regular graph. Each node of Gd is associated with a distinct
color and called a seed. For i > d, let Gi−1 be the graph constructed at the end of step i − 1.
At step i, set pi = 1/(log i)a. (2) At time step i, create a new node v. (3) With probability pi,
v chooses a new color, c say, in which case: (a) we say that v is a seed node, (b) (PA scheme)
add one edge (v, u) such that u is chosen with probability proportional to the degrees among all
nodes in Gi−1, and (c) (Randomness) add d − 1 edges (v, u j) for j = 1, 2, · · · , d − 1, where u j is
chosen randomly and uniformly among all seed nodes in Gi−1. (4) Otherwise, then v chooses an
old color, in which case: (a) (Randomness) v chooses randomly and uniformly an old color, and
(b) (Homophyly and PA scheme) create d edges from v to nodes of the same color as v chosen
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with probability proportional to the degrees of the nodes in Gi−1.
Obviously the model is dynamic. The mechanisms of the model are homophyly, randomness
(or uncertainty) and preferential attachment. Clearly, each of the three mechanisms is a natural
mechanism in evolution of networking systems in nature and society.
Mathematical Principles
We will show that networks generated from the security model are secure against any attacks
of small-scales under both uniform and random threshold cascading failure models.
The authors have shown that networks of the security model satisfy four groups of topolog-
ical, probabilistic and combinatorial principles (A. Li, Y. Pan and W. Zhang, Provable security
of networks).
Let a > 1 be the homophyly exponent, and d ≥ 4 be a natural number. Let G = (V, E) be
a network constructed by our model. Then with probability 1 − o(1), G satisfies the following
four principles each of which consists of a number of interesting properties.
The first is a fundamental principle, consisting of a number of topological and probabilistic
properties: (1) (Basic properties): (i) The number of seed nodes is bounded in the interval
[ n2 loga n , 2nloga n], and (ii) Each homochromatic set has a size bounded by O(loga+1 n); (2) For degree
distributions, we have: (i) The degrees of the induced subgraph of a homochromatic set follow a
power law, (ii) The degrees of nodes of a homochromatic set follow a power law, and (iii) (Power
law) Degrees of nodes in V follow a power law; (3) For node-to-node distances, we have: (i) The
induced subgraph of a homochromatic set has a diameter bounded by O(log log n), (ii) (Small
world phenomenon) The average node to node distance of G is bounded by O(log n), and (iii)
(Local algorithm for navigating) There is an algorithm to find a short path between arbitrarily
given two nodes in time complexity O(log n); and (4) (Small community phenomenon) There
are 1 − o(1) fraction of nodes of G each of which belongs to a homochromatic set, W say, such
that the conductance of W, Φ(W), is bounded by O
(
1
|W |β
)
for β = a−14(a+1) .
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We define a community of G to be the induced subgraph of a homochromatic set. By the
fundamental principle, we know that all the communities are small, that G has both a power law
local structure and a power law global structure, that G has not only a short diameter, but also
a local algorithm of time complexity O(log n) to find a short path between arbitrarily given two
nodes, and that G has a remarkable community structure.
The second is a degree priority principle, consisting of some properties of the degree priority
of vertices of G.
Let v be a node of G. We consider the homochromatic sets of all the neighbors of v. We
define the length of degrees of v to be the number of colors of the neighbors of v, written by l(v).
For each j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , l(v)}, let X j be the j-th largest homochromatic set of all the neighbors of
v (break ties arbitrarily). We define the j-th degree of v to be the size of X j.
Then we have the following degree priority principle:
For a randomly chosen node v, with probability 1 − o(1), the following properties hold: (1)
The length of degrees of v is bounded by O(log n), (2) The first degree of v is the number of v’s
neighbors that share the same color as v, (3) The second degree of v is bounded by O(1), so that
for any possible j > 1, the j-th degree of v is O(1), and (4) The first degree of a seed node is at
least Ω(log a+14 n).
The third one is an infection-inclusion principle, created by homophyly and randomness of
the model.
Let x and y be two nodes of G. We say that x injures y, if the infection of x contributes to
the probability that y becomes infected. Otherwise, we say that x fails to injure y.
Let X and Y be two homochromatic sets. Suppose that GX and GY are the induced com-
munities by X and Y respectively. Let x0, and y0 be the seed nodes of X, and Y respectively.
Suppose that x0 and y0 are created at time step s and t respectively. The infection-inclusion
principle ensures that with probability 1− o(1), the following properties hold: (1) If s < t, then:
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(i) community GX fails to injure any non-seed node in community GY , and (ii) the number of
neighbors of the seed node y0 that are in X is bounded by a constant O(1); and (2) If s > t, then:
(i) all the non-seed nodes in GX fail to injure any node in community GY , (ii) the number of
neighbors of the seed node y0 that are in X is bounded by 1, and (iii) the injury of a non-seed
node in Y from the seed node of X follows only the edge created by step (3) (b) of the definition
of the model.
The infection-inclusion principle shows that homophyly creates some inclusiveness among
the non-seed nodes, and that a community protects its non-seed members from being arbitrarily
injured by the collection of their neighbor communities.
The fourth one is an infection priority tree principle. We define the infection priority tree
T of G as follows: (i) for each edge e = (u, v) in G, if u and v were created at time steps s > t
respectively, then we interpret the edge e = (u, v) as a directed edge from u to v, (ii) let H be the
graph obtained from G by deleting all edges created by (3) (c) of definition of our model, and
(iii) let T be the graph obtained from H by merging each of the homochromatic set into a single
node, and at the same time, keeping all the directed edges.
We have the following infection priority tree principle: (1) T is a tree on which the injury
directions always going to the early created nodes, and (2) with probability 1−o(1), the infection
priority tree T has a height bounded by O(log n).
Note that the direction in T is determined by the injury of a non-seed node from a seed node
of a neighbor community as shown in the infection-inclusion principle.
Proofs of Security
By combining the four principles together, we are able to prove some security results.
Let G be a network constructed by our model. By the fundamental principle, all the com-
munities are small, and the number of seed nodes is large. Let X be a homochromatic set with
seed x0. Suppose that there is no node in X which has been targeted. By the degree priority
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principle, the first and second degrees of x0 is at leastΩ(log a+14 n), and at moat O(1) respectively.
Therefore, the seed node x0 of GX is hard to be infected by a single neighbor community GY , if
any. Furthermore, by the same principle, the length of degrees of x0 is at most O(log n), there-
fore, for properly chosen a, the seed node x0 of GX is hard to be infected by the collection of all
its neighbor communities.
We say that a community GX is strong, if the seed x0 of X can not be infected by the
collection of all its neighbor communities alone, and vulnerable, otherwise. The degree priority
principle ensures that for properly chosen a, almost all communities are strong.
By definition of the infection priority tree T , and by the infection-inclusion principle, infec-
tions among strong communities from its neighbor communities must be triggered by an edge
in the infection priority tree T of G. We further explain this as follows.
Suppose that GX, GY and GZ are strong communities. Let x0, y0 and z0 be the seed nodes
of X, Y and Z respectively. Suppose that x0, y0 and z0 are created at time step t1, t2 and t3
respectively.
Then it is possible that x0 infects a non-seed node y1 ∈ Y , y1 infects the seed node y0 of
Y and y0 infects a non-seed node z1 ∈ Z. By the infection-inclusion principle, we have that
t1 > t2 > t3, and that the edges (x0, y1) and (y0, z1) are created by step (3) (b) of the construction
of the network so that the edges are embedded in the infection priority tree T of G.
By the infection priority tree principle, T is directed with direction always going towards the
early created nodes, and T has height bounded by O(log n), with probability 1−o(1). Therefore
whenever a strong community triggers an infection in the priority tree, it generates at most
O(log n) many strong communities to be infected, where a community is infected, if at least one
node of the community has been infected.
By the fundamental principle, each community has size at most O(loga+1 n). Therefore an
infected community contributes at most O(loga+1 n) many infected nodes.
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By using the ideas above, we estimate the number of infected nodes by an attack of small
scales. By the degree priority principle, for properly chosen a, almost all communities are
strong. Let k be the number of vulnerable communities. Then k must be negligible.
Suppose that S is a set of nodes of size logc n for some constant c. We attack all the nodes
in S . Then there are at most |S | + k communities each of which triggers an infection in the
infection priority tree T . By the infection priority tree principle, the total number of infected
communities is at most O((|S | + k) · log n). Therefore even if all the nodes of an infected
community are infected, the total number of nodes that are infected by attacks on S is at most
O((|S | + k) loga+2 n), which could be o(n).
Now the only problem is to estimate the number of vulnerable communities k which is some
probabilistic arguments. In fact, we have shown that: (1) For the uniform threshold cascading
model, for a > 4, and d ≥ 4, let G be a network constructed by our security model, then with
probability 1 − o(1), the following event occurs: For some φ = o(1), for any constant c, and
any set S of vertices of G, if S has size bounded by logc n, then the infection set of S in G
with uniform threshold φ has size o(n), where n is the number of vertices of G; and (2) For the
random threshold cascading model, for a > 6, and d ≥ 4, let G be a network of the security
model, then with probability 1 − o(1), the following event occurs: For any constant c, any set S
of vertices of G, if the size of S is bounded by logc n, then the infection set of S in G has size
o(n).
Experiments
Our theoretical results require a > 4 and a > 6 for the uniform and random threshold
cascading models respectively. The reason is the degree priority principle. We know that the
lower bound of the first degree of a seed node isΩ(log a+14 n), which depends on a, and that in the
worst case, the degree of the seed node contributed by all its neighbor communities is O(log n).
To make sure that a community is strong in the case that the threshold of the seed node is
11
sufficiently small, we have to choose a to be appropriately large. Therefore, if a is too small,
then the number of strong communities will be relatively small, in which case, the network of
the model will be less secure. However we will show that networks of the security model with
small a have much better security than that of the other models.
Our experiments below show that even if just for a > 1, the networks of our model are
much more secure than that of the ER and PA models. From Figure 2, we have that for any size
n, for a network of either the PA model or the ER model, the attacks of size only log n would
probably generate a global cascading failure of the network. In sharp contrast to this, for any
n, any attacks of log n size are unlikely to generate a global cascading failure of the networks
generated from the security model. For the uniform threshold cascading failure model, we
compare the security thresholds of networks of the three models. From Figure 3, we have that
the curve of the security thresholds of networks of the security model is the lowest, much better
than that of the ER and PA models.
In summary, both theoretical analysis and experiments show that networks of our model re-
sist cascading failure of attacks, for which homophyly, randomness and preferential attachment
are the underlying mechanisms. Our fundamental principle also shows that networks of the
security model follow a power law and satisfy the small world property, and more importantly,
allowing a navigation algorithm of time complexity O(log n). This shows that power law and
small world property are never obstacles of security of networks.
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Figure 1: (a), (b) are the curves of cascading failure and injured nodes by nodes removal
of networks for n = 10, 000 and d = 10 of the ER and PA models respectively. The red
curves are fractions of injury sets of attacks on the top degree nodes of size up to 5 · log n,
and the curves colored blue are the fractions of the largest infection sets among 100 times
of attacks of the top degree nodes of size less than 5 · log n under the random threshold
cascading failure model.
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Figure 2: Security curves of networks of the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi model, the preferential attachment
model and the security model. In this figure, we consider the case of random thresholds. It
depicts the curves of the greatest size of the cascading failure sets of attacks of 100 times of
size log n for each n less than or equal to 10, 000. The curves describe the greatest sizes of the
final cascading failure sets among 100 times attacks of the random thresholds. The sizes of the
initial attacks are always log n, where n is the number of nodes of the networks.
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Figure 3: Security curves for initial size log n, a = 1.5 and d = 5. We consider networks of
nodes up to 100, 000, each of which has average number of edges d = 5. For the security
model, we set the homophyly exponent a = 1.5 for all the networks. This describes the curves
of security thresholds of the networks generated from the 3 models of nodes up to 100, 000
and of average number of edges d for d = 5 respectively. In this experiment, the initial set of
attacks are the top degree nodes of size log n. The homophyly exponent a is chosen as 1.5 for
the security model.
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